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"RIGHTS OF ENGLISHMEN" SINCE 1776:
SOME ANGLO-AMERICAN NOTES*
WILLIAM

F.

SWINDLERt

In commemorating the two hundred years since English
colonists in the New World concluded that they could secure
their "rights as Englishmen" only by breaking free from England
itself, the most meaningful perspective will derive from an appraisal of both English and American constitutional evolution
since then. For central to the crisis of 1774-1783 was the fact that
the colonies and the mother country proceeded from fundamentally, irreconcilably opposed understandings of the British constitution itself. The American Revolution effected fundamental
changes in England and in America, launching both nations
upon new courses on which they have continued to the present.
It should follow, therefore, that the most practical evaluation of
the one course will depend upon a comparable evaluation of the
other.
I.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPASSE OF

A.

1776

The Sea Change of Viewpoints

For most of the 170 years from the drafting of the first
charter of the Virginia Company of London in 1606 to the third
* This Article is in part based on a lecture given at Lincoln's Inn, London, January
8, 1975.
t John Marshall Professor of Law, College of William and Mary.
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and final Declaration of the Continental Congress in 1776, Englishmen on both sides of the Atlantic took for granted their
respective theories of the constitutional status of British
America. Lord Coke, who in 1606 had a hand in drafting the
first charter of the Virginia Company of London, authored the
opinion in Calvin's Case' two years later, which reaffirmed the
feudal doctrine of prerogative extra regnum.2 During this same
period Coke was beginning to orient himself with the Parliamentary party attacking the domestic prerogative, 3 a dichotomy that
characterized the nascent theory of an imperial constitution.4 In
retrospect, it was rather evident that few persons in England saw
in the granting of the Virginia Charter an instrument for ex5
tending domestic constitutional rights beyond the seas.
The Virginia settlers, again in restrospect, consistently argued that such extension was intended in the Charter's oft-cited
words-"that all and everie the parsons being our subjects ...
shall have and enjoy all liberties, franchises and immunities
within anie of our other dominions to all intents and purposes as
.if. they had been abiding and borne within this our realme of
Englande or anie other of our saide dominions." Yet, a centuryand-a-half after Coke, Sir William Blackstone would restate him
unhesitatingly:
Our American plantations [were] principally . . . obtained in the last century either by right of conquest
and driving out the natives (with what natural justice I
shall not at present enquire) or by treaties. And therefore the common law of England, as such, has no allow1 7 Co. Rep. la,77 Eng. Rep. 377 (C.P. 1608).
2Id. at 15a-16a, 18a, 23b, 25a-28a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 394-96, 398, 405-06, 407-10.
3

See W. SWINDLER, MAGNA CARTA: LEGEND AND LEGACY 166-67, 172-77, 182-85,

189-90, 195 (1965).
4 On the constitutional background and formation of the First British Empire see
generally 1 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 143-70, 175-80 (J. Rose, A.
Newton & E. Benians eds. 1929); D. KEIR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN
BRITAIN SINCE 1485, at 293-364 (9th ed. 1969); A. KEITH, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
THE FIRST BRITISH EMPIRE 3-58 (1930); Holdsworth, The Conventions of the Eighteenth
Century Constitution, 17 IOWA L. REV. 161 (1932); Holdsworth, The House of Lords,
1689-1783 (pts. 1-2), 45 L.Q.R. 307, 432 (1929); Temperly, Inner and Outer Cabinet and
Privy Council, 1679-1783, 27 ENG. HIST. REV. 682 (1912).
' But see Black, The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists, 124 U. PA. L.

1157, 1174-91 (1976) (Coke not so much a champion of Parliamentary supremacy
specifically as of limited and principled government generally).
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ance or authority there; they being no part of the
mother-country, but distinct (though dependent) dominions. They are subject, however, to the control of the
parliament, though . . . not bound by any acts of par7
liament, unless particularly named.
For Coke and Blackstone alike, the constitutional principle
was corroborated in domestic as well as imperial law; if the authority was not appropriately to be found in the latter, manifest
authority existed in the common law, which unvaryingly recognized the paramount jurisdiction of the Crown over subordinate
charters granted to local entities. 8 It was scarcely to be suggested,
therefore, that an overseas province differed significantly from
such subordinate agencies within England itself. No concerted
protest arose among colonial spokesmen upon passage of the
Navigation Act of 1660" or upon establishment of the Lords
Commissioners for Trade and Plantations (Board of Trade) in
1696.10
The constitution of the First British Empire, indeed, developed so laconically as virtually to confirm the saying about the
empire itself-that it was acquired absentmindedly. The Act of
Union in 1707,11 indeed, offered such immediate and manifest
economic advantages that the most articulate Scottish nationalists
were momentarily mollified. With the advent of the House of
Hanover, the first and second Georges devoted their primary
attention to their Germanic hereditaments, leaving the development of both the union and the colonies to native English ministers, who established overseas administrations so diverse in
character that no one could argue that any consistent, uniform
imperial policy attested any guarantees to colonials.
Yet the colonials in the New World, at least, saw their legal
status as readily distinguishable from the mercantilistic East
India Company or Crown colonies like Jamaica, Barbados, and
Bermuda. The recalling of charters, they later contended, might
convert a province from a proprietary to a royal jurisdiction, but
7 1
8

W.

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*109 (emphasis supplied).

On the imperial constitution, see generally note 3 supra; de Montpensier, The

British Doctrineof ParliamentarySovereignty: A Critical Inquiry, 26 LA. L. REV. 753 (1966).
9 An Act for the Encouraging of Shipping and Navigation, 12 Car. 2, c.18 (1660);
see G. BEER, THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF ENGLAND TOWARD THE AMERICAN COLONIES,
in 3 STUDIES IN HISTORY ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 36-42 (No. 2, 1893).
10 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE
1 1

268-99 (1929).

The Union with Scotland Act, 6 Anne, c.11 (1707).
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it did not extinguish the rights of which the charters themselves
were merely declaratory; in such a climate of conviction, John
Locke was invited to draft the Fundamental Constitutions of
Carolina in 1669.12 Moreover, in certain instances the local governments assumed the right to incorporate English law into their
own legislative structure-thus the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641.13 William Penn, a prototype of the post-Restoration
dissenter in England, commended Magna Carta to the settlers of
his new proprietary1 4 and further urged them that "if in the
constitution by charter there is anything that jars, change it";15
while in 1736 Sir John Randolph, newly elected Speaker of the
House of Burgesses, was heard to declare to the new royal governor of Virginia that it was established custom for the King's
representative to confirm all liberties and franchises theretofore
16
enjoyed.
In the long period of "benign neglect" under Robert
Walpole's ministry, the American colonists were able to nurture
these assumptions without disposition in England to dispute
them. With victory in the Seven Years' (French and Indian) War,
which brought an enormous new portion of the Western Hemisphere under the British flag, came the need to reorganize the
empire, and leaders on both sides of the Atlantic awakened with
a shock to the fundamental difference in viewpoints that had
grown up unattended in the previous generations.
B.

The View From Westminster
If in 1765 an Englishman had been asked to characterize the
constitutional gains of the previous century's revolution, he
would almost certainly have pointed to the Petition of Right of
12 THE FUNDAMENTAL

CONSTITUTIONS OF CAROLINA, in

7

OLD SOUTH LEAFLETS

393

(No.13172, undated).
A Coppie of the Liberties of the Massachusets Collonie in New England, 8 COLL. MASS.

HIST. Soc. 216 (3d ser. 1843). See Gray, Remarks on the Early Laws of Massachusetts Bay,
id. 191. When in 1683 New York drafted a similar document, however, the Restoration
government disallowed it, the King's advisers fearing that it infringed the royal prerogative. Hazeltine, The Influence of Magna Carta on American Constitutional Development, in
MAGNA CARTA COMMEMORATION ESSAYS 180, 195 (H. Malden ed. 1917); see J. GOEBEL &
T.

NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 327-28 (1944).

14 W. PENN, THE EXCELLENT PRIVILEDGE OF LIBERTY & PROPERTY BEING THE
BIRTH-RIGHT OF THE FREE-BORN SUBJECTS OF ENGLAND (1687).
15 W. SWINDLER, supra note 3, at 214 (quoting statement by Penn to freeholders of
his proprietary on his second visit to Pennsylvania in 1699-170 1).
16
JOURNALS 'OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES OF VIRGINIA: 1727-1734, 1736-1740, at
241-42 (H. McIlwaine ed. 1910).
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1627,'7 the Habeas Corpus Acts of 164018 and 1679,19 the Bill of
Rights of 168820 a decade later, and the Act of Settlement of
1701 21 -all recognized elements of the English constitution.
That is to say, these were rights of Englishmen in England; and
when Englishmen in America subsequently claimed the benefit
of these constitutional gains, parliamentary pamphleteers
shrewdly pointed out that if the colonists expected such entitlements, which Parliament had enacted, they could not consis22
tently deny parliamentary jurisdiction in other matters.
Parliament itself, despite 1776 and 1783, never wavered in
its assumption of its jurisdiction. Indeed, the arguments of
Burke, Fox, and the two Pitts, sympathetic to the American
cause though they were, proceeded from the same assumption
of parliamentary authority vis-a-vis the empire, contending only
that the policy for administering that authority was censurable.
Whig criticism of the Stamp Act, 23 the cornerstone upon which a
reorganized imperial structure was to be assembled, was certainly not framed in terms of ultra vires parliamentary legislation.
The Grenville proposal of spring, 1764, had, in fact, been essentially an extension of the Molasses Act of 1732,24 which the
American colonists had met not with ideological arguments but
with smuggling developed to a fine art.
Parliament, in the decade after the Seven Years' War, was in
no mood to indulge overseas temperamentalism; it had to deal
with a succession of cantankerous issues at home. The war had
ended not only the era in which a global network of settlements
could be administered with little involvement of the mother
25
country but the era of post-Restoration establishment as well.
17 3 Car. 1, c.1 (1627).

18 16 Car. 1, c.10 (1640).
1"31 Car. 2, c.2 (1679).

20 1 W. & M. sess. 2, c.2 (1688).

21 12 & 13 Will. 3, c.2 (1700).
22

See, e.g.,

W. KNox, THE

CONTROVERSY

BETWEEN

GREAT BRITAIN

AND

HER

COLONIES REVIEWED 6-7 (1769):

If they fhould unhappily be able to demonftrate that the Colonies are no part
of the Britifh ftate; that they are the king's ddmain, and not annexed to the
realm; that the inhabitants are not Britifh fubjects nor within the jurifdiction
of parliament; they can have no title to fuch privileges and immunities as the
people of England derive under acts of parliament, nor to any other of thofe
rights which are peculiar to Britifh fubjects within the realm.
23 5 Geo. 3, c.12 (1765).
24 6 Geo. 2, c.13 (1732).
25Cf. D. KEIR, supra note 4, at 298-99; T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD,
TUTIONAL HISTORY

FROM THE TEUTONIC

CONQUEST

ENGLISH CONSTI-

TO THE PRESENT TIME

502-29,
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The winter of 1763-1764 had been the time of the John Wilkes
furor and the famous Issue No. 45 of the North Briton;2 6 from
27
1769 to 1782 a running debate over the Middlesex elections
would preoccupy both houses far more than the war in America.
And in 1771 the Lord Mayor of London was arrested for contempt of Commons, with Chief Justice De Grey refusing to issue
a prerogative writ of habeas corpus. 28 A legislative body that had
been the dominant force in government for more than a century
was in need of modernization-and once the American war was
over, the movement for parliamentary reform began. Independence, like empire, was in some degree a product of absentmindedness or diverted attention.
In any case, Westminster consistently viewed the imperial
constitution in terms of overseas settlements' being responsible
for their internal affairs while Parliament retained total power
over matters in any way affecting the interests of the empire as a
whole. The annoying business of the Stamp Act of 176529 was
admittedly an impolitic use of parliamentary authority; but in
repealing the act the following year, 30 the established view of the
imperial constitution was strongly reaffirmed in the Declaratory
Act:
WHEREAS several of the houses of representativesin his
Majesty's colonies and plantations in America, have of late,
against law, claimed to themselves, or to the general assemblies
of the same, the sole and exclusive right of imposing duties and
taxes upon his Majesty's subjects in the said colonies and
plantations.... be it declared .... That the said colonies
and plantations in America have been, are, and of right
ought to be, subordinate unto, and dependent upon the
31
imperial crown and parliament of Great Britain ....
585-665 (10th ed. 1943). See also J.

CANNON, PARLIAMENTARY REFORM:

1640-1832, at

47-52 (1973).
26 Wilkes was a rabble-rousing reformer who flouted tradition by directly attacking
the Crown in his newspaper, the North Briton. Although he successfully pleaded Parliamentary privilege against a prosecution for criminal libel, The Case of John Wilkes
esq. on a Habeas Corpus, 19 STATE TRIALS 981 (T. Howell ed. 1813), a majority of both
Houses voted that privilege did not extend to libel and expelled him. See E. WILLIAMS,
THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY

232-38 (1960).
27 Id. 239-44.
28 Id. 245-48.
29 5 Geo. 3, c.12 (1765).
21 6 Geo. 3, c.ll (1766).

31 6 Geo. 3, c.12 (1766).
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Some saw the need for a reasonable accommodation.
Thomas Pownall, who had studied the colonial mind closely during his tenure as war governor in the sixties, stressed that
Britain's essential requirement from its empire was economic
rather than political, that parliamentary taxation should be exclusively for imperial needs (a suggestion the next ministry
sought to apply, but in vain), and that a single, unified ministry
be given responsibility for colonial administration and resolution of disputes between the colonies and between the colonies
and the mother country.3 2 Time was to run out, however, before accommodation of any sort could have a fair chance.
C. The View From the Colonies
The Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress of 1765 articulated the now classic assumptions of the American settlers
-"That his Majesty's Liege Subjects in these Colonies, are intitled to all the inherent Rights and Liberties of his Natural born
Subjects, within the Kingdom of Great-Britain" and "That it is
inseparably essential to the Freedom of a People, and the undoubted Right of Englishmen, that no Taxes be imposed on
them, but with their own Consent, given personally, or by their
Representatives. 3 3 For the next ten years, this unilateral exposition of English constitutional law (which was also substantially
inaccurate3 4) would be repeated and belabored by the colonists.
In 1768 the Massachusetts General Court remonstrated in a letter to the Earl of Sherburne that "the constitution of Great Britain is the common right of all British subjects,"3 5 a position
asserted three years earlier in Patrick Henry's Stamp Act Resolutions before the Virginia House of Burgesses.3 6
By the time of the First Continental Congress in 1774,
therefore, it required little clairvoyance to perceive that the par32

T. POWNALL, THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COLONIES 10-40 (4th ed. 1768).
The Declarations of the Stamp Act Congress (1765), in SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF
THE STAMP ACT CONGRESS 1764-1766, at 62-63 (E. Morgan ed. 1959).
34 Cf. D. KEIR, supra note 4, at 352-54, 357-58; T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note
25, at 784-85. See generally MAN VERSUS SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY BRITAIN: SIX
33

(J. Clifford ed. 1968). But see Black, supra note 5, at 1158-74 (colonists
may well have been wrong in construing their rights under royal charters and British
common law but presented a strong case in terms of the evolutionary development of
the British constitution toward dominion relationship with Great Britain).
35
MASSACHUSETTS STATE PAPERS 137 (A. Bradford ed. 1818).
36
JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES OF VIRGINIA 1761-1765, at lxiv-iv, 360 (J.
Kennedy ed. 1907).
POINTS OF VIEW
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liamentary position in the Declaratory Act was irreconcilable
with the Declaration and Resolves of that Congress. The latter
instrument repeated much of what had been said by the Stamp
Act Congress, and enlarged upon it: The first settlers came to
the New World "entitled to all the rights, liberties, and immunities of free and natural-born subjects, within the realm of
England"; by emigration they did not divest themselves, nor
could they be divested, of these rights; fundamental among
these rights was representation in their own legislative assembly;
and by the ipse dixit of such an assembly the colonists were "entitled to all the immunities and privileges granted & confirmed to
them by royal charters, or secured by their several codes of pro37
vincial laws."
When the Second Continental Congress received the North
ministry's rebuff-predictable enough, given the constitutional
viewpoint of Westminster-the Declaration of 1775, on the
Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms, 38 became the transition from 1774 to the final Declaration-that of Independence
in 1776. The bill of particulars set out in the Declaration of 1776
was the final statement of the American view of the British constitution; how totally it failed to persuade the English public in
general may be seen in the point-by-point refutation written that
same year by a London barrister.
"He has refused his Assent to Laws," said the Declaration;
the answer to this first charge was largely technical-assent per
se is unnecessary, but the Crown might disallow colonial enactments contrary to imperial interests.3 9 "He has forbidden his
Governors to pass Laws of immediate and pressing importance,
unless suspended in their operation till his Assent should be
obtained"; to which it was replied that suspension is essential to
guard against the said conflicts. 40 "He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, etc."; something, according to the
writer, done only when circumstances threatened the orderly
conduct of business in the customary site. 4 ' "He has made
Judges dependent on his will alone"; a practice similar to this
37 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS: 1774-1789, at 68-69 (W. Ford ed.

1904).

38 2 Id. 140-57 (1905).
39J. LIND, AN ANSWER TO THE DECLARATION OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 13-15
(5th ed. 1776).
40
41 Id.16-22.

1d. 29-31.
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obtains in England, it was said.4 2 "He has erected a multitude of
New Offices"-a necessity for the enormous North American
possessions that had fallen to the empire with the victory over
France.4 3 For the same reason, standing armies to protect the
Indian-infested region were justified; quartering of troops in
North America was less common than in Ireland; and the great
issue of taxation without consent was rejected on the basis of
precedents from the Long Parliament and the reigns of Charles
44
II, William III, Anne and George I and 11.
With such a complete conflict of viewpoints, each side could
only follow the course to which its own assumptions had committed it. The First British Empire (which would not survive the
American Revolution) either had to prevail over the American
viewpoint or to cut off the American possessions from its jurisdiction. The American colonists, if they persisted in their concept of the rights of Englishmen, could validate the concept only
by becoming free to write those principles into their own fundamental law.
II.

A.

THE EMERGING COMMONWEALTHS

American Constitutionalismof the 19th Century

Two developments in particular attest to the determination
of the Revolutionary era Americans to make good the claims to
the legal heritage they had insisted upon in the preindependence declarations. Both were initially and dramatically demonstrated in legislative actions in Virginia-in George
Mason's Declaration of Rights, adopted in June, 1776, before the
adoption of the new state constitution itself,45 and in the statute
noting the "reception" of the English common law, passed by the
new state assembly in 1776.46 The "reception" statute was
42 Id. 45-47; cf. Smith, An Independent Judiciary: The Colonial Background, 124 U. PA.
L. REV. 1104, 1105-10 (1976).
43

J.

LIND, AN ANSWER TO THE DECLARATION OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 48-50

(5th ed. 1776).
441d. 51-54, 58-59, 64-70. In reply to the charge that the Crown had fomented
"domestic insurrections" in the colonies (i.e., fomented slave rebellions), Lind asked, "Is
it for them to fay, that it is tyranny to bid a flave be free? to bid him take courage, to
rife and affift in reducing his tyrants to a due obedience to law?" Id. 107.
45 1 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON: 1725-1792, at 274-91 (R. Rutland ed. 1970).
46 Act of May, 1776, c. V, § 6, in 9 [Va.] Stat. at Large 127 (W. Hening ed. 1821).
See also Smith, supra note 42, at 1110-11; Johnson, John Jay: Lawyer in a Time of Transition, 1764-1775, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1260, 1264-65 (1976).
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accompanied by another, continuing in force certain acts of
Parliament that the "committee of revisors"--George Wythe,
Thomas Jefferson, and Edmund Pendleton-had culled from
the statutes of the realm. 4 7- Thus, in Virginia and a number of
other states that drafted new constitutions and organized new
legislatures, the common law and statutory benefits (which Parliament had consistently denied extended to the colonies in
course) now became the basic frame of reference for the new
48
governments.
In several respects, this process of "reception" was to create
problems for the new nation. To "receive" the common law as of
a given date (for example, "the sixth year of the reign of James
I") was to incorporate into the rules of decision of the jurisdiction many obsolescences such as the Rule in Shelley's Case. 4 9 It
would require more than three-quarters of a century to excise
this particular archaism, and the excision had to be made by
legislative action. 50 This was only one of many elements of ancient property law that had to be dealt with in similar fashion in
51
the course of the nineteenth century.
The second major problem of "reception" was that it cut off
American law from the benefits of the succession of parliamentary reforms of the English common law that took place half a
century after independence, in the development of the Second
British Empire. 52 The long, often contrived, rationale that
American jurists had to develop to take advantage of the modernization of tort law in Lord Campbell's Act of 1846, 53 only
belatedly ratified by some American legislatures, 54 demonstrates
the problem.
On the other hand, constitutional development among the
American states in the course of the nineteenth century seemed
to vindicate the Jeffersonian axiom that each generation was

11

Act of October, 1776, c. ix, in 9 [Va.] Stat. at Large 175, 177 (W. Hening ed.
1821). The actual report was never formally accepted but was adopted piecemeal under
the sponsorship of James Monroe. See 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 305-665

(J. Boyd ed. 1950).
48 E. BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAW: 1776-1836, at 23-26 (1964).

49Shelley's case, 1 Co. Rep. 88b, 76 Eng. Rep. 199 (K.B. 1581).
noSee, e.g., [1849] VA. CODE tit. 33, c.116, § 11.
5'See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 202-27 (1973). See generally id.

228-47.
52 Cf. id. 96-98.

" The Fatal Accidents Act, 9 & 10 Vict., c.93 (1846).
14See generally L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 51, at 421-22.
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entitled to its own revolution. The Northwest Ordinance of
1787,55 that beau geste of the expiring Continental Congress, directed that prospective states in the territories take as their
model the constitution and codes of one or another of the existing states. This not only perpetuated the problems of the "reception" statutes, but encouraged a tendency toward sameness
among state constitutions. But the readiness of most states to
scrap existing constitutions and draft new ones-even though
the basic provisions remained essentially the same-did make
possible the enlargement of such instruments (in itself a mixed
blessing) to provide basic controls over new aspects of the growing political economy.
Thus, a wave of new constitution writing swept across many
of the older, Atlantic seaboard states at the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century. This wave emanated from several
political epicenters-the effort in some states to broaden the
franchise,5 6 and the concern with the depredations of wildcat
banking enterprises encouraged by visionary or predatory legislatures in others. 5 7 Some of the new constitutional articles reflected the western enthusiasm for the self-consciously styled
"American system" of Henry Clay, and fastened upon some
states a burden that the grandchildren of the convention delegates would still be struggling to discharge. 5 8 The mid-century
saw new waves of constitution-making, stimulated by railroad5' The corrupbuilding and the rate-fixing that accompanied it.
tion of state and local government in the post-Civil War generation led to inclusion of vast amounts of restrictive language in
the legislative and executive articles of many documents, 60 while
the new states of the Far West introduced new ideas of riparian
s5An Ordinance for the government of the territory of the United States North
West of the River Ohio, 1 Stat. 51 n.(a), in 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS

334-43 (R. Hill ed. 1936).
'6See, e.g., 1 A. HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA
327-28 (1974).
57ALA. CONST. art. 6, Establishment of Banks (1819), in 1 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS
OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 45-46 (W. Swindler ed. 1973).

5'See generally Westin, The Supreme Court, the Populist Movement, and the Campaign of
1896, 15J. POL. 3 (1953).
59Cf. ILL. CONST., Municipal Subscriptions to Railroads or Private Corporations (1870),
in 3 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 307, 313 (W. Swindler

ed. 1974): ("reflect[ing] the disillusionment of many Midwestern states with the highpressure promotional tactics of railroad agents of the time").
6-Cf. 1 id. 34-37, 85-88, 108-13 (legislative articles of the Alabama constitutions of
1819, 1867, and 1875, grew from 29 to 37 to 56 detailed sections).
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rights, 6 1 women's suffrage, 62 and that panacea of the early Progressive Movement, the triad of initiative, referendum, and
63
recall.
The most fundamental of constitutional changes, however,
was in the federal Constitution-the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment in 1868. With the shifting of emphasis in judicial
construction away from the conceded original purpose of the
amendment (the guaranteeing of civil rights to the newly freed
blacks 64 ) to the jurisprudence of laissez-faire so congenial to the
burgeoning free enterprise, interstate economy of the last half of
the century, 65 American constitutional history was set on a
course that did not waver until the depression of the 1930's.66
When, in the constitutional crisis of 1937,67 doctrine shifted
from laissez-faire to a broad concept of legislative power, the ultimate impact of the theory embodied in the fourteenth amendment became manifest. This was the unequivocal definition of
dual citizenship 68 in each American citizen, which now awaited
only the intellectual ingenuity of an activist Court, a quarter of a
century later, to extend constitutional jurisdiction over the interests of national citizens through incorporation of most provisions of the Bill of Rights into the due process clause of the
amendment. 69 By the end of the Warren Court, a unitary constitutionalism had been established in the United States on the
eve of the bicentennial.
B. British Constitutionalismin the 19th Centur,
The reforms that began in Parliament after American
independence-products of the end-of-the-century Enlightenment rather than of the late Revolution-were characterized by
l id. 500-01.
62 COLO. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1876), in 2 id. 78, 94 (convention "evaded the issue
61 CALIF. CONST. art. XIV (1879), in

...and passed it to the legislature").
63 Arizona was not admitted to statehood until it agreed to guarantee judges against
recall. 1 id. 298-99, 301-10.
64 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67-72 (1873) (Miller, J.).
65

See generally W.

SWINDLER,

COURT

AND

CONSTITUTION

IN

THE

TWENTIETH

IN

THE

TWENTIETH

IN

THE

TWENTIETH

CENTURY: THE OLD LEGALITY, 1889-1932, at 18-38 (1969).
66

See generally id. 206-20, 223-51, 283-303.
generally W. SWINDLER, COURT AND

67See

CONSTITUTION

CENTURY: THE NEw LEGALITY, 1932-1968, at 3-116 (1970).
"See

generally

W.

SWINDLER,

COURT

AND

CONSTITUTION

CENTURY: A MODERN INTERPRETATION 233 (1974).
6
1 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (White, J.).
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alternating bold advances and withdrawals dictated by second
thoughts. Fox's Libel Act of 179270 was counterbalanced by the
Seditious Meetings and Assemblies Act of 1795;71 and the far
greater shock of the French Revolution hampered liberalizing
movements in England for almost a generation. Yet the reactions
to the Reign of Terror and the Napoleonic age that followed
delayed rather than dissipated the inexorable pressure for
democratization that culminated in the Reform Act of 1832.72
With this legislation, half a century after the post-Restoration
constitution had manifested itself bankrupt, the way was opened,
in Dicey's classic analysis, for an accelerating control over gov73
ernment by a majority (middle class) of English society.
Domestically, this was a prelude to successive statutory reforms in contract, property, and tort law in the 1840's and
1850's.1 4 As for the imperial constitution, these changes in Great
Britain created a parliamentary viewpoint more responsive to
the agitation for the American theory of a right to selfgovernment that had proved the fatal issue of 1776. Ironically
enough, the reform of the imperial structure began in Canada as
a result of the great exodus of Loyalists from the United States
during and immediately after the Revolution. One constitutional
historian has shrewdly described the situation:
The Loyalists, while honourably distinguished by their
fidelity to the Crown, were the heirs of the colonial
tradition in which they had been nurtured, nor was it
reasonable to expect them to accept an inferior constitutional status because their fidelity had led them into
exile .... In 1784 these settlers petitioned for the establishment of representative institutions in Canada. In
1791 an Act was passed separating Upper Canada, with
its mainly English population, from the mainly French
Lower Canada, and setting up representative institutions in each . . . . Thus the British North. American
colonies all came to possess constitutions geierally simi'" 32 Geo. 3, c.60 (1792).
7 36 Geo. 3, c.8 (1795).
72 2 Will. 4, c.45 (1832). See generally 13 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 155-308 (A. Goodhart & H. Hanbury eds. 1952).
7'See generally A. DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC
OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 62-301 (1905).
74 9 & 10 Vict. c.93 (1846). See generally 15 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 72, at
220-21.
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lar to those existing during the earlier stages of colonial
75
history.
The British North America Act of 1867, ' 6 initiating the
transformation of the Second Empire into the Third, introduced
the dominion concept of imperial organization.7 7 It is tempting,
if not entirely accurate, to compare the Durham Report, 78 which
led to the North America Act, with the Northwest Ordinance,
which set the pattern for territorial administration and statemaking across major portions of the United States. Although a
special commission on Australian federation was appointed in
1870, clearly inspired by the Canadian experience, a Commonwealth Act was not agreed upon until 1900, 7 9 and this document
followed the American constitutional pattern more closely than
the 1867 act. 80 New Zealand's modern constitutional status was
established in 1875, in the form of a unitary rather than a federal constitution,8 1 and South Africa followed this example in
the Union Act of 1909.82
A comparative analysis of American and British constitutional development in the century-and-a-half after independence
shows a number of contrasts and similarities, both causes and
effects of American expansion across a continent and of British
administration around the world. One of the fundamental "rights
of Englishmen" claimed from the seventeenth century revolution
was legislative supremacy. In a unitary government, or even a
United Kingdom, this doctrine was relatively simple for Parliament to maintain; 8 3 in a federal system, at least in the first half
of the nineteenth century, the state constitutional practice of
dividing or decentralizing the executive function achieved
D. KEIR, supra note 4, at 442-43.
76 30 & 31 Vict., c.3 (1867).
7 See 14 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 72, at 266-69, 295-302. See generally 0. HOOD
'

PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

609-34 (5th ed. 1973).

78 For an excellent discussion of the substance and background of Lord Durham's
report and his tenure as Governor General of Canada, see 14 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 72, at 278-87.
7, See D. KIER, supra note 4, at 550-51.
80 Cf. Durack & Wilson, Do We Need a New Constitution for the Commonwealth? 41
AUST. L.J. 231 (1967); Moffat, Philosophical Foundations of the Australian Constitutional
Tradition, 5 SYDNEY L. REV. 59, 77-83 (1965).
81 New Zealand was governed by a "quasi-federal" constitution until, in 1875, the
provinces were abolished pursuant to enabling legislation enacted seven years earlier.
14 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 72, at 316-18.
82 D. KEIR, supra note 4, at 551.
'3 See Black, supra note 5, at 1168-74.
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somewhat the same result. 84 The basic feature of parliamentary
government has been the accountability of the executive branch
to the legislative. 85 The American constitutional system, committed from the outset to a separation of powers, has not been able
to assert accountability in the same degree or manner. 8 6 Congressional government, despite Woodrow Wilson's sanguine
commentary, 87 has not produced a reassuring record of accomplishment, either in the Reconstruction Era or in the postWatergate years. Indeed, it may be argued plausibly that a steadily strengthened presidential form of government, despite the
divisive effect of the Nixon debacle, has provided the vital ele88
ment of stability in twentieth century United States affairs.
The duality of parliamentary functions in domestic and imperial affairs was uniquely effective in the nineteenth century
world. The Imperial Conferences that began in 1894 enabled
Britain to mobilize global efforts for the First World War with
maximum efficiency;8 9 and the major post-war conference in
1926 laid the blueprint for the Dominion organization of the
Commonwealth of Nations which was certified in 1931 in the
Statute of Westminster.9" With the 1926 Imperial Conference,
indeed, the rights of local government that Americans had insisted upon 150 years earlier became the general rule. Since
1931, and particularly since World War II, the course of constitutionalism in the British sphere has been toward decentralization, while the course in the United States, since the Great Depression, has been toward centralization.
Ill.
A.

RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE

'E Pluribus Unum" and "Ex Uno Phtres"?

After two centuries of change, the issues that separated Englishmen in the New World from Englishmen at home have
84

Cf. Swindler, The Executive Power in State and Federal Constitutions, 1

HASTINGS

CONST.L.Q. 21, 22 (1974).

85See generally 0. HOOD PHILLIPS, supra note 77, at 261-83.
"8See Swindler, Accountability: The Constitutional Goal, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 459
(1975).
17 W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 197 (1973): "Congress is fast becoming
the governing body of the nation ...."
"See generally E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1948, at
321-37, 353-64 (3d ed. 1948); T. SORENSEN, DECISION-MAKING IN THE WHITE HOUSE:
THE OLIVE BRANCH OR THE ARROWS (1963).
89See D. KEIR, supra note 4, at 557-58.
9022 & 23 Geo. 5, c.4 (1931); See D. KEIR, supra note 4, at 559-60.
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undergone changes of their own. The Empire, despite Winston
Churchill's fervent wartime rhetoric, did not last a thousand
years-but men will indeed remember its finest hours. The "land
of the free," for whose rebirth of freedom Abraham Lincoln
called in the course of the American Civil War, began to fulfill
that dream only a century later. In the twentieth century the
United States has moved with inexorable logic toward a centralized political economy. The British Commonwealth, and the
United Kingdom, have moved and continue to move toward
"devolution."
The present American and British constitutional systems
both must function in a world society that has moved from the
individualism of the "bills of rights" of 1689 and 1791 to the
collectivism of "human rights" (Menschenrechte) in the international law of 1976.92 Because, in Locke's phrase, preservation of
individual rights is the ultimate purpose for which governments
are instituted, 93 the extent of their preservation in our day may
be taken as the test of the surviving validity of the English and
American constitutions; and, in the twentieth century these
rights will best be preserved through preservation of collective
human rights.
In both the English and American systems individualism to
a degree has given way, as it has on the world scene, to collective
security-in labor relations,9 4 in social welfare, 95 in guaranteed
opportunities for all citizens or subjects. 96 This transition has
been characterized in American life by a shift toward "unitary
federalism. '97 The results of British decentralization, when and
as these may be carried to logical extremes, remain to be seen,
98
influenced as they are by Scottish and Welsh nationalism.
American political acceptance of centralization under the New
Deal compelled a judicial reorientation; 99 and a quarter of a

"'

See 1 ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION: 1969-1973, at 165-66 (1973). See
generally id. 165-363.
92 See Swindler, Tile Rights of Man: A Bicentennial Perspective, in THE EVOLUTION OF
ISSUES AND IDEAS IN AMERICA: 1776-1976 (B. Taylor ed. 1976) (forthcoming).
11J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT §§ 123-31 (1690), in
LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 184-86 (T.Cook ed. 1947).

J.

91 See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970).
. See, e.g., Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1970).
"' See, e.g., Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (1970).
' Miller, Toward a Concept of ConstitutionalDuty, 1968 SuP. CT. REV. 199.
9
See generally 1 ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION: 1969-1973, at 21-45,
133-51 (1973); 2 id. 84-108 (dissenting proposal).
19 See generally W. SWINDLER, supra note 67, at 3-116.
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century later the Supreme Court showed every sign of being
substantially ahead of the politicians in the drive toward
centralization. 10 0 British political acceptance ofthe idea of
decentralization-to the degree it is accepted-has been compelled by a realistic appraisal of the shifts in power, domestically
and internationally, since the Second World War.
The American constitutional revolution that began in the
New Deal era and climaxed in the years of the Warren Court' 01
has been consolidated rather than repudiated by the Burger
Court' 0 2 and thus seems to have fixed the character of American

life for the immediate future. The changes in British constitutional posture may presage another revolution, although its outcome is not yet predictable. In its approach to the matter of
devolution, the Royal Commission on the Constitution took care
to develop its recommendations within the historic framework of
the Union and the Commonwealth:
We have seen that one of the main causes of discontent with government is the centralisation-or overcentralisation as many see it-of power in London. One
of our principal tasks is to consider the desirability and
possible means of transferring the exercise of government power away from London and nearer to the people whose lives it affects. This transfer could take many
different forms, depending upon the number and size
of the geographical areas over which the transferred
powers were to be exercised, the extent of those powers,
the constitution of the bodies to which they were transferred and the relationship of those bodies to Parliament and the central government." 3
At a time when the Nixon administration was making much
of the idea of returning power to the states,' 0 4 the United Kingdom was launched upon a national debate on a similar issue,
dramatized in Scotland by the North Sea oil development and in
' See Swindler, The Warren Court: Completion of a ConstitutionalRevolution, 23 VAND.
L. REV. 205 (1970).
"01 See generally W. SWINDLER, supra note 67, at 215-353.
102

See Swindler, The Court, the Constitution, and Chief Justice Burger, 27 VAND. L. REV.

443 (1974).
,03 1 ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION: 1969-1973, at 165 (1973). See gen-

erally id. 86-93; 2 id. 10-36 (dissenting views).
104 See, e.g., State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C. § 1221 et seq.
(Supp. III, 1973).
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Northern Ireland by the exacerbating hostilities between the
Protestant and Roman Catholic populations. The Royal Commission had considered and rejected a complete return of
sovereignty to the constituent parts of the United Kingdom
(separatism), and had further determined that a federal system
was not feasible.1 0 5 It then proceeded to recommend specific
aspects of legislative, executive, and administrative devolution
that Parliament in some cases has taken under study and in
10 6
other cases apparently has tabled.
One of the major intellectual obstacles to such a fundamental shift in British constitutionalism is the reasonable concern
over what, in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, is referred to
as "entrenchment"-a crystallizing of law as distinguished from
the flexibility of "conventions": 10 7 such "entrenchment" would
require judicial review, which the British courts might be unable
or unwilling to engage in, and which would, in any case, jeopardize the supremacy of Parliament and thus reduce the experimental flexibility that is the hallmark of the British system of
"conventions."' 0 8

If these questions seem to Americans to suggest ready answers, one must be cautioned that the trend of British judicial
doctrine for the past two centuries has been in the diametrically
opposed direction. For one of the leading British students of
constitutionalism, the solution would have to be an Americanstyle "higher law" document:
The solution is to bring into being a 'New' Parliament which would owe its existence to a Constitution not
enacted by itself, from which it would derive both its powers and its limitations. . . . A Constitution limiting the
powers of the 'New' Parliament ... would be adopted

by the 'Old' Parliament, and then submitted for adoption by the people in a referendum. The Old (unlimited) Parliament would be abolished, and it would be
superseded by the New (limited) Parliament.1 0 9
105
10.

See 1 ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION: 1969-1973, at 133-61 (1973).
See id. 225-326.

"', See generally 0. HOOD PHILLIPS, supra note 77, at 77-91.
Cf. Durack & Wilson, supra note 80.
109 O. HooD PHILLIPS, REFORM OF THE CONSTITUTION 156-57 (1970). For a Cana108

dian debate on the same subject, see Tarnopolsky & Schmeiser, Entrenchment of a Bill of
Rights, 33 SASK. L. REV. 247 (1968).

"RIGHTS OF ENGLISHMEN"

1976]

Before such a step is taken, if it ever is, the American experience
with judicial review will merit careful study by the constitutionmakers of the United Kingdom in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The striking fact, at the time of the bicentennial, is
that American and British constitutional thought should evince
such a serious interest in shifting poles.
B.

"L'Esprit des Constitutions"

Such thinking is manifestly a response to the changing
worldwide frames of reference, and for Britain has taken on
added urgency in the past decade of agitation over relationships
with, and currently involvement in, the European Economic
Community."' ° Over the longer term, this change in worldwide
frames of reference can be traced to the implications either of a
world community or of a worldwide system of communities dating from the organization of the United Nations in 1945, itself
the culmination of a search for collective security of nations and
individuals which dated at least from the Treaty of Paris in
1856.111 Essentially, the international quest has posed anomalies

and conflicts for the traditions of both British and American
constitutionalism.
The humanitarian objectives behind the First and Second
Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, the abortive effort at
international organization in the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1919, and the worldwide sense of outrage at the Nazi
atrocities in World War II which led both to the United Nations
Charter and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, presented British and American constitutional law with hard
choices. Both countries faced the prospect of having to harmonize the traditional rationale of individualism with developing
notions of internationalism. In the United States this took the
form of agitation for the so-called Bricker Amendment of the
post-war decade. 1 2 In the British Commonwealth, it led to the
agonizing disputes over the European Economic Community
1 13
and the European Commission on Human Rights.
10See generally D.

LASOK & J.

BRIDGE,

INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
"1'

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND

226-29 (1973).

For a text of the Treaty of Paris, see 114 THE CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES

410-20 (C. Parry ed. 1969).
12 See N. DOWLING &- G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
386-87 (7th ed. 1965) and authorities cited therein.
113 See generally D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 110, at 226-29.
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For a quarter of a century after World War II, the pressure
for international commitments mounted. In 1952 the United
Nations drafted the Convention on the Political Rights of
Women. a14 In 1960 came the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; 115 in 1963, the
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination;1 16 and in 1966, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 1 7 Because almost all of
these documents purportedly articulated the ideals of liberal
political and constitutional thought everywhere, the pressure
upon individualistic traditions to conform was applied by what
one writer calls the "external constituency," adding,
It happens to be the case that the status quo powers, not being able to identify sufficiently with the victims . . .

,

are also not willing to make the kind of

commitment that is needed to make those claims effectively realized, and therefore, it means acquiescing in
the suppression of these rights in those countries. 1
Thus confronted with internal pressures for localizing the
power of domestic government and external pressures in favor
of collective security and liability for individual and institutional
rights, Anglo-American constitutional practice faces a frame of
reference substantially different from what it has known in the
past two centuries. The cold war between liberalism and totalitarianism, complicated by the emergence of a powerful "third
world" with objectives of its own, has little to offer or learn from
guidelines of this past. The values that seemed self-evident in
1689, 1776, and 1787 must be restated, if not accommodated
with broader demands of world society in the last quarter of the
twentieth century.
Such an accommodation or restatement requires considering whether the fundamental assumptions of the English and
1 14

See UNITED NATIONS, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION,
365 (8th ed. 1968). See generally id. 364-69.
115 See id. 397. See generally id. 396-426.
III See id. 359. See generally id. 358-59.
117
See id. 138-39 (8th ed. supp. 1971).
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118 INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: BACKGROUND PAPERS AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWELFTH HAMMARSKJ6LD FORUM 46 (J. Carey ed. 1968) (statement

of Professor Richard A. Falk).
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American constitutions are logically and essentially relevant to
the proliferating demands for human, economic, social, and cultural rights in the triangulated world power structure of 1976. A
good case can be made that they are; if it could not, the developments of the past two hundred years might well have been
in vain.

